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YOU CAN’T GET THERE FROM HERE: 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE WALMART V. DUKES 









In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Supreme Court determined the plaintiffs had not 
shown, based on the evidence, that there were questions of law or fact common to 
the class. The allegedly discriminatory decisions had been made by individual 
supervisors at different stores who had been given discretion by Wal-Mart to 
make pay and promotion decisions. The Court stated the problem was that there 
was no specific evidence that all the discretionary decisions were made in a 
manner that reflected gender bias. This case not only reversed decades of court 
acceptance of social framework evidence in employment litigation but also 
insulates businesses from class action suits by imposing a huge barrier to class 
certification. This Article first reviews the Wal-Mart v. Dukes decision with 
respect to how it adversely affects the viability of class action suits that have 
historically provided recourse for individuals who are less able to pursue 
individual claims of discrimination. This Article then examines implications of 
Dukes and other decisions for the court’s ability to address the problem of 
second-generation discrimination. In particular, we focus on the difficulties 
created by requiring the application of a clearly defined policy and practice to all 
cases involved. Finally, this Article suggests that given that policy and practice 
continue to be a requirement for class certification, one could meet this 
requirement by reframing classes using a theory analogous to the “fraud on the 
market” doctrine employed in securities cases. In other words, organizations that 
have a policy of nondiscrimination but allow individual managers to make 
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employment decisions any way the managers please could be viewed as 
perpetuating a type of “fraud-on-the-employment market” in which plaintiffs 
have relied on a material misstatement of fact when accepting their positions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article looks at the impact Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes1 has had on 
class action lawsuits involving claims of gender discrimination. Dukes involved a 
class action lawsuit filed against Wal-Mart by 1.5 million female employees 
claiming gender discrimination.2 The United States Supreme Court refused to 
certify the class action based on the Court’s interpretation of the commonality 
requirement stated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.3 Rule 23 is a procedural 
rule required for a lawsuit to be certified as a class action so that the substantive 
issues may be heard. The Dukes decision represents an example of the far-
reaching power of procedural rules.  
“[P]rocedure is power, whether in the hands of lawyers or 
judges.” . . . Procedural rules often have enormous influence on the 
outcome of a case and can effectively deny litigants the 
opportunity of reaching the merits. Nowhere, perhaps, is this more 
                                                          
1 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 2550-2551 (“[T]he crux of this case is commonality – the rule requiring a plaintiff to show 
that ‘there are questions of law or fact common to the class.’”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)).  
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evident than with class certifications, which require that plaintiffs 
seeking to sue as a group explicitly obtain approval from a court 
before their joint claims can go forward.4 
Due to the fact that the plaintiffs in Dukes were denied class certification, 
there are some who view the Dukes decision as a victory for corporate America 
and believe that the plaintiffs’ bar has to find new and creative ways to proceed 
with class action lawsuits.5 In this Article, by focusing on the implications of the 
Dukes decision for future class actions, we intend to provide a novel approach to 
certifying class action discrimination cases. Part of our focus will be on what is 
called “second-generation discrimination,”6 which we believe was the main type 
of gender discrimination present in Dukes. We will look at the purposes of class 
action discrimination suits, and how Dukes adversely affected an important 
mechanism in a class action for addressing second-generation discrimination 
cases. Then, we examine the implications of Dukes and similar cases to determine 
whether, in a post-Dukes world, the judiciary can adequately address second-
generation discrimination while constrained by the Supreme Court’s strict “policy 
and practice” requirement. Finally, we offer a suggestion for satisfying the policy 
and practice requirement for class certification by proposing that class 
certification could be framed using an approach analogous to the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine found in securities cases. The fraud-on-the-employment-market 
approach we propose is consistent with research indicating that unconscious bias 
is pervasive, is linked to discriminatory behavior, and is more likely when 
employment criteria remain undefined and decision making is subjective,7 as in 
                                                          
4 Julie Slater, Reaping the Benefits of Class Certification: How and When Should “Significant 
Proof” Be Required Post-Dukes?, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1259, 1259 (2011) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on 
Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1292-93 (2000)). 
5 Sarah Kellogg, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: The Implications, 26 WASH. LAWYER 22, 29 (2011). 
6 See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) for a full description and analysis of what second-generation 
employment discrimination means; Sonia Goltz et al., University Women's Experiences in 
Bringing Second Generation Sex Discrimination Claims: Further Support for Adoption of a 
Structural Approach, 18 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 145 (2009). 
7 See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. 
REV. 741, 744 (2005) (“Claims of excessive subjectivity in decisionmaking can arise in individual 
cases challenging a particular employment decision, or in class action suits more broadly 
challenging an employer’s policies and practices.”); Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in 
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 487 (2005) (“The 
problem is even more severe when a diffuse and subjective evaluative process is coupled with the 
‘solo effect’ that occurs in situations where minority and female employees are evaluated by 
mostly white peers or supervisors.”). 




Wal-Mart’s policy of allowing local managers discretionary power in promotions 
and pay increase decisions. 
I. WAL-MART V. DUKES AND CLASS CERTIFICATION  
A. Purposes of Class Action Discrimination Suits  
Class action discrimination suits provide multiple benefits: they provide an 
individual opportunity for justice, make the court system more efficient, and 
bolster society’s ability to enforce laws.  
An example illustrates these points: Mary Smith is a hypothetical Wal-Mart 
cashier who has worked for Wal-Mart for five years and has had excellent 
performance evaluations. However, she has only had three small raises and no 
promotion. John, who started as a cashier three years ago, has now been promoted 
to be Mary’s supervisor. John was promoted instead of Mary, even though Mary 
met all of the qualifications for the promotion. Mary knows of other females in 
her store and in other Wal-Mart stores in the region who have been similarly 
passed over for a promotion. Mary and the other women believe that the reason 
they have not been promoted and have received lower pay increases is because 
they are female and that Wal-Mart’s policy of allowing local managers to make 
those decisions without many clear guidelines or supervision creates these 
discriminatory decisions.  
Mary could file a discrimination lawsuit against Wal-Mart herself. 
However, lawsuits are expensive, and Mary would be unable to afford it. 
Furthermore, Wal-Mart could easily defend an individual lawsuit. Instead, Mary 
and the other female employees would be best served by filing a class action 
lawsuit. A class action suit is the most viable method for individuals to take on a 
large corporation, such as Wal-Mart. 
Mary’s situation is typical of each of the individual plaintiffs in Dukes. In 
Dukes, each plaintiff had a relatively small claim and limited resources.8 It would 
have been almost impossible for each of them to file a separate lawsuit against 
Wal-Mart. In these situations, absent the threat of a class action lawsuit, large 
employers may have financial incentives to violate the law in small but pervasive 
ways for two reasons: (1) small financial gains can add up quickly for a large 
company; and (2) most people like Mary are unable to afford to sue for small 
                                                          
8 See Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 36-37, available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/18/ (“For many employees and others, 
a class action is their only meaningful access to the courts. Those with small claims and limited 
resources are unlikely to challenge powerful corporations on their own….”). 
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violations.9 The complexity of discrimination suits and high attorneys’ fees and 
expenses prevent most individuals from seeking relief in the courts.  
 Unlike single-plaintiff suits, class actions avoid the up-front expenses to 
individual plaintiffs because attorneys generally accept the suits on a contingency-
fee basis. The attorney will front the costs of proceeding with the case, ensuring 
that the plaintiffs will get their day in court. Filing a class action suit was the most 
practical way for plaintiffs, like those in Dukes, to seek relief and force Wal-Mart 
to change its corporate policy. 
 Furthermore, class action lawsuits prevent the court system from being 
flooded with individual lawsuits and provide the judiciary with a more efficient 
tool, compared to requiring individual lawsuits against the same corporate 
defendant. Increased efficiency leads to greater impact. As Professors Catherine 
Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky point out, the rise of large corporations in the early 
twentieth century was coupled with a rising need to protect individuals from 
exploitation.10 As a result, the courts and legislatures developed the class action 
suit as a procedural device to prevent abuse.11 The class action lawsuit provided 
an end-run around the problem of the prohibitively high cost of single-plaintiff 
suits by allowing a large number of individuals to sue a corporation in one 
lawsuit. The consolidation of suits not only made it economically feasible for 
low-income individuals to sue exploitative companies, but it also provided an 
incentive for companies to stop exploiting their employees in the first place. 
Moreover, class actions also serve as a mechanism for judicial legal 
enforcement.12 The class certification process provides courts broad oversight  
concerning key factual questions related to corporate behavior. This line of 
inquiry is particularly important because it provides a forum for broad analysis of 
corporate behavior that may not be blatant in an individual instance.  
B. Dukes v. Wal-Mart  
Dukes v. Wal-Mart was filed in 2001.13 It was one of the largest class action 
lawsuits filed against a private employer.14 A group of female Wal-Mart 
                                                          
9 See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith In Class Actions: Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL'Y 73, 74-75 
(2011). 
10 Id. at 74 (citations omitted).  
11 Id. 
12 See id. at 74-75.  
13 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 509 F.3d 1168 
(9th Cir. 2007), aff’d en banc, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
14 The plaintiffs, all female employees of Wal-Mart, totaled about 1.5 million. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011). For additional demographic information, see Brief for Respondents 
at 20-21, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277):  
 




employees filed the suit on behalf of “[a]ll women employed at any Wal-Mart 
domestic retail store at any time since December 26, 1998 who have been or may 
be subjected to Wal-Mart’s challenged pay and management track promotions 
policy and practices.”15 The plaintiffs alleged Wal-Mart made promotion 
decisions favoring men, and paid women less than men in comparable positions. 
The women alleged they were discriminated against because Wal-Mart had a 
corporate policy of allowing individual managers to make pay and promotion 
decisions “in a largely subjective manner.”16 The female employees claimed that 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
The district court found that “roughly 65 percent of hourly employees are 
women, while roughly 33 percent of management employees are women.” 
. . . When Wal-Mart's proportion of women in management was compared to 
that of its 20 largest competitors, 80% of its stores had significantly fewer 
female managers. The district court credited plaintiffs' proof that . . . “a 
statistically significant shortfall of women [were] being promoted into each of 
the in-store management classifications over the entire class period.” This 
shortfall was “consistent in nearly every geographic region at Wal-
Mart.” Women also consistently took longer than men to advance to 
management positions. . . . These differences existed even though female 
employees at Wal-Mart generally have more seniority and better performance 
ratings than male employees. . . .Plaintiffs' statistical regressions for hourly and 
salaried employees showed that . . . women were paid significantly less than 
men, and this pay gap increased each year. This pattern was consistent for all 
store classifications even when seniority, turnover, store, job performance, job 
position, part-time or full-time status, and other relevant factors were taken into 
account.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
15 Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. at 141-42. 
16 Id. at 145; 
All hourly employees at every Wal-Mart store are compensated pursuant to the 
same general pay structure. Each store has a minimum starting wage for each 
class of hourly jobs that is set by the Wal-Mart Home Office in 
Arkansas. Beyond that, Store Managers are granted substantial discretion in 
making salary decisions for hourly employees in their respective stores. 
Specifically, they are allowed to depart from the minimum start rates, within a 
two dollar per hour range, without being constrained by objective criteria and 
with limited oversight. . . . As with salary decisions, the parties agree that 
subjectivity is a primary feature of promotion decisions for in-store employees. 
In the words of Wal-Mart President and CEO Thomas Coughlin, “We push 
down to the manager of the facility level, [sic.] the responsibility to run those 
stores right.” 
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these discretionary policies shaped a corporate culture that allowed discriminatory 
practices to flourish.17  
The plaintiffs alleged, 
[W]omen at Wal-Mart stores had been paid less than their male 
counterparts every year and in every Wal-Mart region. Plaintiffs’ 
evidence showed that women in hourly positions made, on 
average, $1,100 per year less than men. In salaried management 
positions, the average difference was $14,500. This inequity had 
developed even though the women had, on average, greater 
seniority and higher performance ratings. The plaintiffs further 
alleged that Wal-Mart’s female employees had been promoted to 
management less often than comparable male employees, and that 
those women who were promoted had to wait longer for promotion 
than their male peers. The evidence they presented showed that, in 
2001, 67% of all hourly workers and 78% of hourly department 
managers were women. By contrast, only 35.7% of assistant 
managers, 14.3% of store managers, and 9.8% of district managers 
were female.18 
 Anecdotal evidence supported the statistical findings.19 For example, a 
male store manager was quoted as saying, “‘Men are here to make a career and 
women aren’t. Retail is for house-wives who just need to earn extra money.’ 
Another male support manager stated: ‘We need you in toys . . . you’re a girl, why 
do you want to be in hardware?’”20 Male managers were not the only staff 
members guilty of such comments. “A female store manager gave a sporting 
goods position to a male employee because she ‘needed a man in the job.’”21 The 
                                                                                                                                                               
Id. at 146-48 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
17 Id. 
18 Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in 
Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 48-49 (2009); accord Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011); Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Wal-
Mart Stores v. Dukes: Lessons for the Legal Quest for Equal Pay, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 229, 240-
43 (2012). 
19 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2548; Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 244-55. See generally Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes: Is 1.6 Million Women 0.6 Too Many? 2 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 151 (2012). 
20 Kathryn Smith, What Do 1.5 Million Wal-Mart Women Have in Common?: Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
Class Action Certification, 52 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 149, 154 (2011) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 166).  
21 Id. (quoting Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 166). For other comments alleged by the plaintiffs see Wal-
Mart v. Dukes - Why the Supreme Court Should Stand with Working Women, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. 
 




anecdotal and statistical evidence strongly suggested that Wal-Mart’s workplace 
culture cultivated both intentional and unintentional discrimination against 
women. 
According to Wal-Mart, the statistical and anecdotal evidence did not show 
questions of law or fact common to the class, a requirement under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In order to proceed with the class action, Rule 23 
requires the court to certify the class. Rule 23(a) provides four requirements that 
must be met for a class action to be certified; the plaintiffs have the burden to 
prove that all four requirements have been met.22 Rule 23(a) authorizes class 
action certification only when:  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
CENTER (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/wal-mart-v-dukes-why-supreme-court-
should-stand-working-women#9:  
 
Men alone are breadwinners, “working as the heads of their households, while 
women are just working for the sake of working.” . . . Another female worker 
was told that “men need to be paid more because they have families to support.” 
A male employee was selected for a position over an (unmarried) female 
employee because he “deserved the position” as “the head of household”—but 
she “did not ‘need’ the position.” Women’s family responsibilities interfere with 
work responsibilities; they “should be at home with a bun in the oven” instead of 
working. One male manager opined that “women should be home barefoot and 
pregnant.” A manager told one woman she could not take an overnight 
supervisor position because she had children. One female employee was told to 
resign and “find a husband to settle down with and have children”—and another 
female employee was told, “you should raise a family and stay in the kitchen.” 
A supervisor asked the only female store manager in her district to resign 
because she “needed to be home raising [her] daughter” instead of running a 
store. Women can’t handle certain jobs—and can’t work in certain “traditionally 
male” departments—because those positions are “a man’s job” or “need[]a 
man.” One woman employee was told, “You’re a girl, why do you want to work 
in Hardware?” Women were “required to clean and stock,” while men who 
worked with them were not. One woman who applied to work in the Sporting 
Goods department was told, ‘”You don’t want to work with guns.” . . . A senior 
vice president told a woman employee that she would not advance because she 
did not “hunt, fish, or do other typically-male activities” and was not “a part of 
the boys club.” . . . A male manager said “women weren't qualified to be 
managers because men had an extra rib.” Women were referred to by demeaning 
names—such as “girls,” “Janie Qs,” and “housewives”—and with degrading 
language—such as “squatter” or “someone who squats to pee.” One manager 
commented that the role of female assistant managers was to give women 
associates someone to discuss their periods with. 
Id.  
22 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2548. 
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(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable;  
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;  
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical 
of the claims or defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.23 
 
In an attempt to meet the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), Dr. 
William Bielby testified for the plaintiffs as to the social frame of reference in 
which employment decisions were made at Wal-Mart.24  
Dr. Bielby provided testimony regarding social framework analysis. 
Laurens Walker and John Monahan first introduced the term “social framework” 
in a law journal article in 1987.25 According to these authors, in social framework 
testimony, “general research results are used to construct a frame of reference or 
background context for deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a 
specific case.”26 The purpose of this type of testimony is to help the fact-finder 
evaluate the specific facts in the context of the setting. The expert’s testimony 
may help to identify particular employment policies that may be susceptible to 
stereotyping and bias. “[T]he expert's role [is] identifying particular policies and 
practices of the employer that might tend to make decisions susceptible to 
stereotyping and bias[.]” “Social framework expert testimony essentially uses 
general social science research to help explain why the law should be applied in a 
particular way to the facts of a particular case.”27  
Social framework testimony is used in many employment discrimination 
cases.28 This type of evidence can further understanding as to why an individual 
held a belief and then acted due to that belief.29 Therefore, the purpose of Dr. 
Bielby’s testimony concerning  social framework evidence was to try to show that 
the subjective decision-making policy could lead to stereotyping and bias. Dr. 
Bielby’s expert report stated: 
                                                          
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Note that in addition to Rule 23(a), plaintiffs seeking class certification 
must also satisfy Rule 23(b). However, the Court did not address that since the commonality 
requirement at issue was under Rule 23(a)(2). Therefore, this article does not elaborate on Rule 
23(b). 
24 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2549. 
25 See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in 
Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1987). 
26 Id. 
27 Hart & Secunda, supra note 18, at 44. 
28 See id. at 41.  
29 See, e.g., id. at 49-50. 




Centralized coordination, reinforced by a strong organizational 
culture, creates and sustains uniformity in personnel policy and 
practice throughout the organizational units of Wal-Mart. 
Subjective and discretionary features of the company's personnel 
policy and practice make decisions about compensation and 
promotion vulnerable to gender bias. Finally, I have concluded that 
there are significant deficiencies in the company's policies and 
practices for identifying and eliminating barriers to equal 
employment opportunity at Wal-Mart.30 
Dr. Bielby’s testimony relied on social science literature that discusses 
organizational practices that allow widespread stereotyping to occur. Such 
organizational practices include decision-making structures in which individual 
actors are allotted a great deal of leeway, increasing the subjectivity of the 
decision. Dr. Bielby’s testimony attempted to establish that the freedom given to 
individual supervisors resulted in a subjective decision-making process and 
ultimately was the proposed question of fact common to the class to satisfy Rule 
23(a)(2). 
Even though the district court and the Ninth Circuit agreed that this 
testimony was enough to establish a common question, the Supreme Court, in a 5-
4 split, disagreed, finding that the requirements of Rule 23 were not met, noting 
that the plaintiffs did not show commonality under Rule 23(a)(2): 
[The plaintiffs’] claims must depend upon a common contention—
for example, the assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the 
same supervisor. That common contention, moreover, must be of 
such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which 
means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue 
that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one 
stroke.31 
The Court cited General Telephone Company of the Southwest v. Falcon32 
for the proposition that there is a requirement to “probe behind the pleadings.”33 
In other words, simply alleging that a common question exists does not make it 
                                                          
30 WILLIAM T. BIELBY,  EXPERT REPORT OF WILLIAM T. BIELBY, PH.D., BETTY DUKES, ET AL. V. 
WAL-MART STORES, INC. 5 (Feb. 3, 2003), available at 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fagan/courses/law_socialscience/documents/Spring_2006/Class%2
017-Gender%20Discrimination/BD_v_Walmart.pdf. 
31 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
32 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
33 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 
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so. There has to be some substantive evidence to support a claim that a common 
question does exist, and if answered, would help resolve the legal issue for the 
entire class.34 The Court decided,  
Respondents have not identified a common mode of exercising 
discretion that pervades the entire company—aside from their 
reliance on Dr. Bielby’s social frameworks analysis that we have 
rejected. In a company of Wal-Mart's size and geographical scope, 
it is quite unbelievable that all managers would exercise their 
discretion in a common way without some common direction. 
Respondents attempt to make that showing by means of statistical 
and anecdotal evidence, but their evidence falls well short.35 
Prior to Dukes, social framework testimony had been used in many types of 
discrimination cases,36 and social science experts were key in providing evidence 
of commonality for class certification. The Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
social framework testimony was a big blow to the viability of class action 
discrimination suits.37 After Dukes, courts are less likely to accept general 
evidence of bias as a basis for fulfilling the commonality requirement mandated in 
Rule 23(a)(2).38  
This rejection also damages attempts to address what has been called 
structural or “second-generation” discrimination.39 This type of discrimination 
refers to aspects of an organization’s structure that facilitate or enable 
unconscious discrimination. Given that many gender discrimination claims 
involve second-generation discrimination, the Court’s decision fundamentally 
changed the landscape for class action lawsuits involving gender discrimination 
claims: 
[T]he Court clarified the scope of the class action “commonality” 
requirement. The majority found the Dukes evidence of a common 
                                                          
34 See id. at 2553-57 for a complete discussion of the facts presented by the plaintiffs. 
35 Id. at 2554-55. 
36 Hart & Secunda, supra note 18, at 50. 
37 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 96-97; Allan G. King & Carole F. Wilder, Dukes v. 
Wal-Mart: Some Closed Doors and Open Issues, LITTLER REPORT (Littler Mendelson, P.C.,) Feb. 
2012, at 1, available at 
http://www.littler.com/files/press/pdf/TheLittlerReportDukesVsWalMartSomeClosedDoorsAndO
penIssues.pdf. 
38 King & Wilder, supra note 37, at 5. 
39 See Goltz et al., supra note 6, at 147-151; Sturm, supra note 6, at 468-475; Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8 
(2006). 




policy—statistical evidence, anecdotal statements, and an expert’s 
testimony—unconvincing, and noted that commonality exists 
where class members have suffered the same injury and not just 
where they have suffered a violation under the same law, such as 
Title VII. . . . the end result of Dukes may be its chilling effect on 
plaintiffs even attempting to sue corporations the size of Wal-
Mart.40  
C. Policy Implications of the Dukes Decision 
Federal laws are often broad statements of national policy, particularly in 
the area of employment law, in part because Congress can be purposefully 
ambiguous on polarizing issues in order to get bills passed.41 Even though 
Congress created an agency, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), to help with interpretations of these laws for employers, the 
judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, regularly interprets employment 
discrimination laws.42 
This policy-setting by the Supreme Court is apparent in the Dukes decision. 
The primary policy issue in class actions is balancing the access of individuals to 
courts and the need for efficiency in the court system with the need to protect 
large businesses from frivolous class action suits. Most class actions that are 
certified go directly to settlement, rather than to trial, because a company’s loss at 
the class certification stage is tantamount to a loss on the merits.43 Presumably, 
                                                          
40 Kellogg, supra note 5, at 26, 29. 
41 Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: 
Recognizing the Agency’s Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51, 52-53 
(1995). 
42 Id. at 54. 
43 According to Edward Sherman:  
The class action is one of the most controversial procedural devices in the 
American legal system. In the years since an expanded class action rule was 
adopted in 1966, class actions have grown in scope and number . . . Business 
critics see this as enabling “lawyers [to] seek out opportunities to bring these 
large-scale suits in the expectation that they will receive large fees, whether or 
not the suit has underlying merit and whether or not the individuals on whose 
behalf the suit is brought benefit significantly from its resolution.”  
Edward F. Sherman, Consumer Class Actions: Who are the Real Winners?, 56 ME. L. REV. 223, 
223 (2004) (citation omitted); accord Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 254 (“Perhaps the majority’s 
bastardization of Watson and heightened focus on the dissimilarities among plaintiffs working in 
many stores across the nation boils down to the Court’s perception that mega-class actions are to 
unwieldy for employers to defend.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  
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plaintiffs’ attorneys pursue certification in the hope that it is granted so the 
defendant has a greater incentive to settle the case. The judiciary properly checks 
these types of coercive actions. However, while courts have a vested interest in 
preventing abuse of class action certification, courts also have a vested interest in 
preventing employee discrimination by large corporations.44 
In part, Dukes represents a public policy decision by the Court to restrict the 
access of individuals with limited means to the courts, instead favoring large 
businesses. The Dukes decision was critical to companies that could face the same 
kind of class-action suits filed by female employees. Thirty-four large 
corporations and other interested groups, including the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, filed Amicus Briefs in support of Wal-Mart in the case.45  
                                                          
44 Edward Sherman describes the consumer advocate’s argument well:  
Consumer advocates, on the other hand, see it as providing “a means of bringing 
a legal action on behalf of a large number of consumers who may be harmed 
when corporations engage in wrongful behavior” that can “succeed in 
eliminating inappropriate business practices that would otherwise impose 
unwarranted costs on individuals.” 
Sherman, supra note 43, at 223 (citation omitted); see Kellogg, supra note 5, at 24 (“This will 
change the way employment discrimination cases are handled in this country permanently because 
it changes the incentives for bringing them.”) (citation omitted); Malveaux, supra note 8, at 37 
(“The Dukes class certification standard jeopardizes potentially meritorious challenges to systemic 
discrimination.”);  
The Chamber of Commerce immediately issued a press release declaring it “the 
most important class action case in more than a decade.” By contrast, the 
Christian Science Monitor called the case “a major blow to working women” 
and a “sign that some of the esteemed judges on our nation’s highest court need 
a primer in how contemporary discrimination functions.” In an interview on 
National Public Radio, a prominent plaintiff’s lawyer called the case “a disaster 
not only for civil rights litigations but for anyone who wants to bring a class 
action,” and commented “[t]he five-male majority decision today represents a 
jaw-dropping form of judicial activism.”  
Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for Cases 
Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 433, 433-34 (2012).  
45 The following entities filed amicus briefs: Intel Corporation, The Association of Global 
Automakers, Inc., The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Washington Legal 
Foundation, Retail Litigation Center, Inc., COSTCO Wholesale Corporation, Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets Association, Altria Group, Inc., Bank of America Corporation, CIGNA 
Corporation, Del Monte Foods Company, General Electric Company, Hewlett-Packard Company, 
Kimberly-Clark Corporation, McKesson Corporation, Microsoft Corporation, NYSE Euronext, 
PepsiCo, Inc., Tyson Foods, Inc., UnitedHealth Group, Inc., United Parcel Service, Inc., Walgreen 
Co., the Williams Companies, Inc., International Association of Defense Counsel, Society for 
 




After the decision, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce issued a press release 
stating that this case was “the most important class action case in more than a 
decade.”46 Howard Erichson, a professor at Fordham Law School in New York, 
said, “‘[t]his was absolutely a victory for business interests.’”47 
The Dukes decision means that large class action suits will be more difficult 
for plaintiffs to certify because demonstrated commonality will be more difficult 
to obtain. Now, class action lawsuits with much smaller classes will be most 
viable because the commonality issue will be easier to meet.48 As a result of 
Dukes, the best route is to file several class action lawsuits on behalf of the female 
employees of Wal-Mart by specific regions or specific groups of females who 
have a more specific common injury. These types of lawsuits are already in 
motion against Wal-Mart.49  
                                                                                                                                                               
Human Resource Management and HR Policy Association, DRI-The Voice of the Defense Bar, 
Atlantic Legal Foundation and New England Legal Foundation, Pacific Legal Foundation, 
California Employment Law Council, and the Washington Legal Foundation. See Walmart v. 
Dukes, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/wal-mart-v-dukes (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2014); see also Adam Liptak, Justices Rules for Wal-Mart in Class-Action Bias Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/business/21bizcourt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (Wal-
Mart’s attorney Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. noting the ruling was “‘an extremely important victory 
not just for Wal-Mart but for all companies who do business in the United States, large and small, 
and their employees, too.’” The sentiment was echoed by Robin Conrad of the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce’s litigation arm, stating, “[t]his is without a doubt the most important class-action case 
in more than a decade”); Barry Bagnato, Wal-Mart Victory in the Supreme Court Case Seen as Big 
Win for U.S. Businesses, CBS NEWS (June 20, 2011, 2:13 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
503544_162-20072645-503544.htm (CBS News Senior Legal Analyst Andrew Cohen stated, 
"[i]t's a win for the company, but also for other big companies who face potential class action 
cases like this one[.]”). 
46 Press Release, U.S Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Applauds Supreme Court Ruling in 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes  (June 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2011/june/us-chamber-applauds-supreme-court-ruling-
wal-mart-v-dukes. 
47 Cezary Podkul, Supreme Court Decision Could Pose Major Obstacle for Future Class-Action 
Claims, WASH. POST (June 20, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/experts-
supreme-court-decision-could-pose-major-obstacle-for-future-class-action-
claims/2011/06/20/AGNd1LdH_story.html. 
48 Kellogg, supra note 5, at 28 (“Attorneys will file smaller and more creatively constructed class 
action suits, but those employment cases that are too broad in scale and geography have definitely 
been buried for good.”). 
49 See Case Finder for Wal-Mart v. Dukes, COHEN MILSTEIN, 
http://www.cohenmilstein.com/cases/99/wal-mart (last visited Aug. 29, 2014) (showing the 
following actions: 4/16/2013 California Wal-Mart Women File for Class Certification in Federal 
Court; 2/2013 Wal-Mart Women Represented By Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC File Class 
Action Lawsuit in Wisconsin Federal Court; 10/4/2012, Wal-Mart Women Plaintiffs File Class 
Action Lawsuit in Florida Federal Court; 10/2/2012, Wal-Mart Women File Class Action Lawsuit 
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Although each of these filings represents a relatively large group of 
plaintiffs, smaller class actions, such as these, may not be able to generate a large 
enough judgment to financially justify the filing of a class action. Instead of one 
large class action filed in one federal court with all the associated costs, there will 
be many smaller class actions in several different federal courts with costs, such 
as expert witnesses, in each court. If the basis for the claim of discrimination is 
the broad subjective corporate policy at the macro level, like the policy at Wal-
Mart, then the testimony by those experts and others will essentially be the same 
in each court; it would be much more efficient to do this one time, instead of five 
or more times.50  
In addition to affecting the size of class action suits, Dukes will make 
“pattern or practice” discrimination claims more difficult to certify. As one author 
stated, the Dukes decision “can be expected to reduce the prospects of success for 
disparate impact and ‘pattern or practice’ discrimination claims, as well as the 
accompanying settlement value of such claims.”51 This raises the question of 
whether the pendulum has swung too far in favor of large employers.  
                                                                                                                                                               
in Tennessee Federal Court; 9/22/2012, Federal Court Gives Green Light to Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
Gender Discrimination Case; 6/6/2012, Nearly 2,000 Wal-Mart Women File EEOC 
Discrimination Charges Against Retailer; 2/2/2012, More Than 500 Wal-Mart Women File EEOC 
Discrimination Charges; 2012, Wal-Mart Women Plaintiffs File Expanded Class Action Lawsuit 
in Texas Federal Court; 10/27/2011, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Plaintiffs File Amended Class Action 
Lawsuit in California Federal Court). 
50 For example, the cost of taking on Wal-Mart to prove pattern or practice discrimination will be 
about the same whether it is the entire corporation or smaller local regions. Usually, the case will 
be taken on a contingency fee basis, which means the law firm will bear all of the costs of the 
lawsuit, in hopes of winning a large settlement and recouping that money plus their contingency 
fee. It is a business decision for law firms, and with smaller groups, the cost/benefit for the law 
firms may mean that they are not willing to pursue those claims. Therefore, regardless of what the 
Court said about being able to pursue individual claims, those types of claims are probably not 
realistic considering the costs involved.  
51 Tippett, supra note 44, at 444 (citation omitted); see Supreme Court Places High Hurdle for 
Women to Overcome Pay Discrimination, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CENTER (June 20, 2011), 
http://www.nwlc.org/press-release/supreme-court-places-high-hurdle-women-overcome-pay-
discrimination. In a statement by National Women’s Law Center Co-President Marcia D. 
Greenberger stated: 
 
Today the Supreme Court issued a devastating decision undoing the 
rights of millions of women across the country to come together and 
hold their employers accountable for their discriminatory practices. The 
Court has told employers that they can rest easy, knowing that the 
bigger and more powerful they are, the less likely their employees will 
be able to come together to secure their rights. Women now have fewer 
rights to challenge discrimination than before today’s 
ruling . . .. Today’s ruling undermines the very purposes of the class 
 




Defendants argue that not all, or even most, employers discriminate, and 
easy class certification is an incentive for plaintiffs to file frivolous lawsuits with 
the hope that they will be certified and the case settled by the defendant because 
of the cost of litigation.52 An overly-easy certification process would appear to a 
defendant as a great injustice. 
Plaintiffs argue that some employers do discriminate and there should be a 
cost-effective method for forcing changes in those employment practices:  
Pattern or practice claims present several advantages for plaintiffs 
over individual disparate treatment claims. First, plaintiffs enjoy a 
more favorable allocation of burdens of proof and stronger 
presumptions. Second, the pattern or practice claim is better suited 
to addressing unconscious or hidden biases. Third, it provides 
savings in litigation costs to plaintiffs, defendants, and courts. 
                                                                                                                                                               
action mechanism and is tantamount to closing the courthouse door on 
millions of women who cannot vindicate their rights one person at a 
time. The women of Wal-Mart—and women everywhere—will now 
face a far steeper road to challenge and correct pay and other forms of 
discrimination in the workplace. 
 
Id.; Bagnato, supra note 45 (“[T]he justices have delivered a huge victory to businesses 
trying to fend off costly class action lawsuit filed by employees.”); Greg Stohr, Wal-Mart 
Class-Action Ruling Gives Employers Shield from High-Dollar Suits, BLOOMBERG (June 
20, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-21/wal-mart-ruling-
gives-employers-shield-from-high-dollar-suits.html (“The U.S. Supreme Court gave the 
country’s largest companies a new shield from multibillion- dollar lawsuits, as the 
justices rejected a bid to sue Wal-Mart Stores Inc. (WMT) on behalf of more than a 
million female workers.”);  
 
You’ve heard about firms that are too big to fail. Now the Supreme 
Court has declared that some companies are too big to be sued for 
discrimination. . . . Given the current court’s enthusiastic deference to 
corporations, most observers expected Monday’s ruling. Still, the facts 
of the case were stark enough to create uncertainty. 
 
Michelle Goldberg, Women Lose in Walmart Suit Ruling, DAILY BEAST (June 20, 2011 
9:06 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/06/20/walmart-discrimination-
suit-supreme-court-ruling-hurts-all-women.html; Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: 
Wal-Mart’s Two Messages, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2011 2:02 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/opinion-analysis-wal-marts-two-messages/ (“For 
large companies in general, the ruling in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, et al. (10-277) 
offered a second message: the bigger the company, the more varied and decentralized its 
job practices, the less likely it will have to face a class-action claim.”). 
52 See, e.g., Charles Silver, "We’re Scared To Death": Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1357-59 (2003). 
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Fourth, courts have greater flexibility at the remedial phase once a 
pattern or practice has been demonstrated. Finally, plaintiffs can 
seek broader discovery and relief by asserting a pattern or practice 
claim rather than an individual disparate treatment claim.53  
Regardless, it appears that both defendants and plaintiffs can save costs in a 
class action lawsuit as compared with pursuing several individual lawsuits: 
Litigating a case as a class action can provide savings to 
defendants, plaintiffs, and courts. For plaintiffs, bringing an action 
together as a class can reduce the information costs of bringing 
suit. Instead of hundreds or thousands of individual lawsuits all 
seeking similar information from the defendant in discovery, a 
class only needs to depose each witness once, pay once for counsel 
to review deposition transcripts and issue discovery requests, and 
can pay the associated costs jointly. It also may be the only way for 
many employees with smaller claims and limited resources to 
challenge systemic discrimination.54  
While it is true that class certification is an incentive for the defendant to 
settle the claim, even claims that may be questionable, it is also true that a loss by 
the plaintiffs at the certification stage provides a great disincentive for a defendant 
to change its behavior. Making certification more difficult may lull employers 
into a false sense of security and cause them to feel as if key structural changes 
are unnecessary. There must be a balance between these two interests.  
However, rather than achieving a balance, Dukes made equal rights second 
to the protection of business interests. Dukes forces us to ask what responsibility, 
if any, employers should take for gender stereotypes and biases that pervade 
American culture when those stereotypes and biases enter the workplace.55  
II. IMPLICATIONS OF DUKES FOR ADDRESSING SECOND-GENERATION   
DISCRIMINATION 
Dukes fundamentally changed how courts address second-generation 
discrimination, which tends to be more built into societal structures and less 
                                                          
53 Angela D. Morrison, Duke-ing Out Pattern Or Practice After Wal-Mart: The EEOC As Fist, 63 
AM. U. L. REV. 87, 94 (2013). 
54 Id. at 100-101 (internal citations omitted). 
55 Tippett, supra note 44, at 434 (citing Melissa Hart, Learning from Wal-Mart 2-3 (U. COLO. L. 
SCH. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES, Working Paper No. 06-36, 2006)). 




obvious than first-generation discrimination, which is more easily proven in 
courts.  
First-generation discrimination involves easily recognizable, blatant 
discrimination, such as deliberate exclusion based on gender. First-generation 
discrimination cases deal mostly with proving specific facts that identify a form of 
discrimination generally accepted as violating the law.56 “Employers handled first 
generation discrimination by putting policies and procedures in place that clearly 
stated that various forms of actual discrimination were prohibited.”57 In fact, 
Justice Scalia referred to Wal-Mart’s first-generation discrimination policy.58  
Second-generation discrimination is less blatant. Susan Sturm initially 
coined the phrase,59 observing:  
[T]he “wrong” of second generation discrimination cannot be 
reduced to a single, universal, or simple theory of discrimination. 
Second generation discrimination does not evoke the first 
generation's clear and vivid moral imagery—the exclusionary sign 
on the door or the fire hose directed at schoolchildren. Instead, the 
applicable normative theories are plural, subtle, and, not 
surprisingly, more complex.60 
Second-generation discrimination is subtler and involves patterns of 
interaction that exclude certain groups over time. Furthermore, second-generation 
discrimination undermines the stated end-goals of company policies created to 
combat its more blatant predecessor, first-generation discrimination. Second-
generation discrimination is structural, situational, and hard to identify. Behaviors 
that form an accepted practice in workplace culture that may lead to biased results 
over time are classic examples of second-generation discrimination.61 
Second-generation discrimination is ongoing in our society, existing along 
with the more blatant first-generation discrimination. To address it, courts can 
simply admit relevant second-generation discrimination evidence.  
                                                          
56 Sturm, supra note 6, at 465-68. 
57 See Goltz et al., supra note 6, at 148; see also Sturm, supra note 6, at 467-68; Susan Bisom-
Rapp, Discerning Form from Substance: Understanding Employer Litigation Prevention 
Strategies, 3 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1, 3-4 (1999). 
58 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011). 
59 Sturm, supra note 6, at 460.  
60 Id. at 473.  
61 See id.; see also Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural 
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 96-99 (2003); 
Bagenstos, supra note 39, at 2; Goltz et al., supra note 6, at 148-51. 
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Because of the amorphous nature of second-generation discrimination, 
however, it is difficult to produce the “correct” type of evidence when the courts 
follow rules developed from first-generation discrimination cases.62 To more 
adequately consider second-generation discrimination, the courts need to allow 
for different types of evidence.  
Unconscious biases “sneak up” on a decision maker. They affect 
perceptions and evaluations of an employee in innumerable 
encounters that occur well before any discrete moment of work-
assignment, promotion, or discharge. By the time the manager 
actually makes such a decision, the die may have already been cast 
by the earlier, biased perceptions. At that point, a supervisor—
unaware of the degree to which the inputs to her decision are 
biased—can believe quite sincerely that she is making a “neutral” 
decision “on the merits.”63 
The difficulty is coming up with specific evidence when the environment 
the discrimination is allowed to exist in is very complex and subtle.64 The lack of 
equal treatment experienced in second-generation discrimination is not a discrete, 
intentional act, but is based on assumptions derived from membership in a certain 
group—such as women—and it is not consciously motivated. For example, when 
a person walks into an auto repair shop to make an appointment and sees five 
males and one female, that person may be more likely to walk up to the female to 
make the appointment (both males and females will do this), because females are 
usually receptionists and not mechanics.65 The person who assumes the female is 
                                                          
62 For a complete discussion see Sturm, supra note 6, at 554; Goltz et al, supra note 6, at 148-49.  
63 Bagenstos, supra note 39, at 8 (citations omitted).  
64 See generally Goltz et al., supra note 6, at 149. 
65 The U.S. Department of Labor more fully describes the workplace percentage breakdowns:  
 
The median percentage of women in craft jobs is 3.9 percent and in 
operative jobs is 7.8 percent. As an example of the relative 
underrepresentation of women in craft jobs in the electrical power 
generation, transmission, and distribution industry, the industry has 
24.8 percent female employees and, of all craftworkers in the industry, 
2.9 percent are women. Similarly, the building material and supplies 
dealers industry has 37.1 percent female employees and, of all 
operatives in the industry, 11.0 percent are women.  
 
BLISS CARTWRIGHT, PATRICK RONALD EDWARDS, & QI WANG, JOB AND INDUSTRY GENDER 
SEGREGATION: NAICS CATEGORIES AND EEO–1 JOB GROUPS, (U.S. Dept. of Lab. 2011), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2011/11/art3full.pdf. 




the receptionist is not consciously discriminating, but instead is acting on an 
assumption that is the result of cultural experience since receptionists are usually 
females and mechanics are usually males. This is an example of unconscious bias 
that could have been part of Wal-Mart’s managers’ decision-making when they 
followed a policy with undefined criteria in regard to promotions and pay 
increases. This type of bias cannot be captured when courts insist on clear 
evidence of bias in the specific decision that was made. 
In Dukes, the majority decision wanted to have the first-generation 
discrimination-type evidence. However, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent demonstrates a 
better understanding of the difference between first-generation and second-
generation discrimination, and its amorphous nature: 
The District Court's identification of a common question, whether 
Wal-Mart's pay and promotions policies gave rise to unlawful 
discrimination, was hardly infirm. The practice of delegating to 
supervisors large discretion to make personnel decisions, 
uncontrolled by formal standards, has long been known to have the 
potential to produce disparate effects. Managers, like all 
humankind, may be prey to biases of which they are unaware. The 
risk of discrimination is heightened when those managers are 
predominantly of one sex, and are steeped in a corporate culture 
that perpetuates gender stereotypes. . . . It is hardly surprising that 
for many managers, the ideal candidate was someone with 
characteristics similar to their own.66  
The Dukes majority perpetuates a legal system that deals poorly with 
second-generation discrimination. Justice Scalia’s opinion reveals the Court’s 
unfamiliarity with second-generation discrimination questions: according to the 
                                                          
66 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2564 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). Justice Ginsburg describes further:  
We have held that “discretionary employment practices” can give rise to Title 
VII claims, not only when such practices are motivated by discriminatory intent 
but also when they produce discriminatory results. . . . Aware of “the problem of 
subconscious stereotypes and prejudices,” we held that the employer’s 
“undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking” was an “employment 
practic[e]” that “may be analyzed under the disparate impact approach.” (citing 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 988, 991 (1988)). 
Id. at 2564-65 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations 
omitted). 
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opinion, because no first-generation questions exist, there is very little, if any, 
evidence of gender discrimination.67 
Even though no specific U.S. Supreme Court case has addressed second-
generation discrimination, one case provided a broad interpretation of the 
application of Title VII using a type of analysis that could have been utilized in 
Dukes. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the first male-on-male 
sexual harassment case, the district court held that Mr. Oncale had no cause of 
action and granted summary judgment to Sundowner.68 Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court reversed, stating:  
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, in relevant part, 
that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.” We have held that this not only covers “terms” and 
“conditions” in the narrow contractual sense, but “evinces a 
congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women in employment.”69 
Even though the case involved male-on-male sexual harassment in the 
workplace, the Court went on to state: 
[A]ssuredly [this was] not the principal evil Congress was 
concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory 
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably 
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws 
rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we 
are governed. Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . 
. . sex” in the “terms” or “conditions” of employment.70 
The Court clearly found that it has the power to interpret the law as long as 
it falls within the purpose of the statute.71  In this circumstance, the statute’s 
purpose was to prohibit sexual discrimination during employment.72 In fact, 
                                                          
67 Id. at 2555. 
68 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998). 
69 Id. at 78 (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)) (alteration and 
omission in original). 
70 Id. at 79 (alteration and omissions in original). 
71 See id. at 81. 
72 See id.  




Justice Scalia (who wrote the majority opinions in both Dukes and Oncale) said 
that statutes may be open to interpretation when the interpretation is in sync with 
the evil that Congress intended to prevent.73 The Court could have applied this 
principle in Dukes because gender discrimination is an evil that Congress 
intended to prevent with Title VII. In Oncale, the Court did not “legislate” some 
new social policy; instead, the Court simply extended an existing rule of law to a 
new circumstance. This type of reasoning could have been used in Dukes.  
Similarly, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank Trust addresses a subjective 
decision-making policy that could have resulted in gender discrimination, even 
though it did not deal with certification of a class action.74 In Watson, the Court 
first recognized that courts must continue to understand that discrimination can be 
structural in nature.75 Fort Worth Bank & Trust, which employed eighty 
individuals, had not developed precise and formal criteria for evaluating 
candidates for certain positions. The plaintiff, Clara Watson, a black female bank 
teller, applied for supervisory positions at the bank four times. In each instance, 
she was passed over in favor of a white applicant. All the supervisors involved in 
denying Watson the four promotions at issue were white. Because no formal 
criteria were used in the decision-making process, the decision makers relied on 
the subjective judgment of supervisors who were acquainted with the candidates 
and with the nature of the jobs to be filled.76  
The Court’s analytic framework in Watson is directly transferrable to cases 
concerning sexual discrimination. The Court recognized that systemic factors in 
the decision-making process could result in discrimination, and, therefore, there 
was no need for specific evidence of discrimination. In Watson, the Court 
recognized that disparate impact analysis can be applied to subjective 
employment practices, including “an employer’s undisciplined system of 
subjective decisionmaking,”77 similar to Wal-Mart’s policy in Dukes.  
The Watson Court noted that the practice of delegating subjective decision-
making authority was as susceptible to disparate impact analysis as an objective 
practice. Watson supports the argument that systemic factors in the decision-
making process could result in discrimination, thusly there is no need for specific 
evidence of discrimination: 
                                                          
73 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. 
74 See 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
75 In fact, in Dukes, Justice Ginsburg cited Watson for this proposition. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2564-65 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
76 Watson, 487 U.S. at 982-85. 
77 Id. at 990. 
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[T]he problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would 
remain. In this case, for example, petitioner was apparently told at 
one point that the teller position was a big responsibility with “a lot 
of money . . . for blacks to have to count.” Such remarks may not 
prove discriminatory intent, but they do suggest a lingering form of 
the problem that Title VII was enacted to combat. If an employer's 
undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has precisely 
the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional 
discrimination, it is difficult to see why Title VII's proscription 
against discriminatory actions should not apply.78  
The Court in Watson again noted that the policy of Title VII was to combat 
discrimination in whatever form it may exist, simply an extension of an existing 
rule.79  
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit in Dukes certified the class 
based on the social framework evidence. However, the Supreme Court rejected 
class certification through the use of social framework testimony as evidence of 
discrimination. The Court viewed the social framework testimony as inadequate 
because it did not make it clear that the stated policy of subjective decision-
making by Wal-Mart managers applied to all the class members. This 
demonstrates that the Court wanted “smoking gun” evidence, only relevant to 
first-generation discrimination cases. Given how difficult it is to prove second-
generation discrimination by pointing to the application of a single explicit 
company policy, the Court’s decision could be viewed as a rejection of the 
attempt to use the court system to address structural discrimination.  
This apparent rejection by the Court does not reflect an awareness of the 
type of discrimination that is most prevalent today: second-generation 
discrimination. It also runs counter to the recent calls for structural change.80 
Effectively addressing second-generation discrimination requires a change from 
rules that focus on discrete events and actions to an approach that focuses on 
restructuring the entire workplace environment. This change in the type of 
evidence allowed in discrimination cases does not create a new policy; it simply 
changes what type of evidence is acceptable to prove discrimination. Dukes 
provided the opportunity to design a framework to address second-generation 
discrimination, but the Supreme Court failed to take advantage of that 
                                                          
78 Id. at 990-91.  
79 Id. 
80 See, e.g., Goltz et al., supra note 6, at 185-88; see also Sturm, supra note 6, at 475-489; Green, 
supra note 61, at 147-48. 




opportunity. Instead, Dukes continued a long tradition of courts failing to provide 
proper remedies for second-generation discrimination.  
Alternatively, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
could address this problem. The EEOC can file a class action lawsuit on behalf of 
plaintiffs without certification under Rule 23. Although the EEOC may provide an 
alternative to a traditional class action lawsuit, there are several reasons why it 
should not be the only option for recourse.  
First, some cases may be better suited to the EEOC versus the traditional 
lawsuit. In the traditional class action lawsuit, the plaintiffs initiate the lawsuit. 
Comparatively, the EEOC process requires the plaintiffs to file a complaint with 
the EEOC. A complaint will only proceed if enough complaints are filed against a 
given employer, as determined by the EEOC. There is no way a plaintiff can 
“force” the agency to make that decision, it is up to the agency’s discretion.81 
There are some other problems with the EEOC filing claims. As Angela 
Morrison points out, despite the investigative and litigation power of the EEOC, 
some courts have put limits on this power:  
This treatment is demonstrated by recent decisions that dismiss the 
EEOC's pattern or practice claim and by decisions that 
significantly limit the EEOC's claim in terms of its scope or for 
whom the EEOC can seek relief. For example, some courts have 
equated the EEOC's right to seek relief to that of the individuals 
for whom the EEOC seeks the relief. In such instances, courts have 
held that because individuals must file their charges of 
discrimination within 180 days of the discriminatory act, the 
EEOC cannot seek relief for individuals against whom the 
discrimination occurred more than 180 days prior to the filing of 
the charge that triggered the EEOC's investigation.82  
                                                          
81 The following EEOC instruction indicates the agency’s broad discretion: 
 
EEOC files employment discrimination lawsuits in select cases. When deciding 
whether to file a lawsuit, we consider several factors, including the seriousness 
of the violation, the type of legal issues in the case, and the wider impact the 
lawsuit could have on our efforts to combat workplace discrimination. Because 
of limited resources, EEOC cannot file a lawsuit in every case where 
discrimination has been found. 
 
Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Aug. 27, 2014). 
82 Morrison, supra note 53, at 128 (citations omitted). 
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In addition to that limitation, some courts have placed additional burdens on 
the EEOC. For example: 
Some courts...have found that the EEOC may only bring a pattern 
or practice claim pursuant to section 707, and that the EEOC is 
therefore limited to declaratory, injunctive, and other equitable 
relief if it establishes a pattern or practice. To seek individual relief 
under this view, the EEOC must allege individual discrimination 
claims under section 706 and prove disparate treatment as to each 
aggrieved individual…the Eighth Circuit in EEOC v. CRST Van 
Expedited, Inc., have found that to seek individual relief for 
persons harmed by the pattern or practice, the EEOC must have 
given the employer an opportunity to conciliate each aggrieved 
person's claim during the administrative processing.83  
In another article, Elizabeth Tippett points to other issues with this type of 
claim and the EEOC: 
My sample produced only four lawsuits brought by the EEOC. By 
contrast, the EEOC brought or intervened in 1,461 Title VII 
lawsuits between 2005 and 2010. The scarcity of EEOC claims 
challenging subjective practices suggests that such practices are 
not considered a priority by the Commission.84  
However, she did go on to say, “[t]he Commission therefore may come 
under increasing pressure to pursue claims involving subjective practices post-
Wal-Mart.”85 
In addition, as argued in Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A 
Structural Approach, the EEOC has problems dealing with second-generation 
discrimination claims. The EEOC will “pre-judge” cases without examining all 
the evidence, causing about half the cases to receive a “no cause” determination.86 
In addition, EEOC attorneys tend to take cases that are relatively uncontroversial 
in order to help their careers.87 The most common problem is poor service and 
delays.88 Researchers, such as Michael Selmi, find that EEOC staff attorneys are 
concerned with advancing their careers, which means that they prefer to take on 
                                                          
83 Id. at 129 (citations omitted). 
84 Tippett, supra note 44, at 457 (citations omitted). 
85 Id. 
86 See Goltz et al., supra note 6, at 161. 
87 Id. at 161-162. 
88 Id. at 175. 




cases that are not very controversial and will have a high probability of success.89 
“In fact, Selmi concludes that the agency finds merit in ‘an extraordinarily low 
percentage of filed claims, brings very few cases,’ and often pursues small easy 
cases.”90  
This is consistent with Susan Bisom-Rapp's observation: 
An EEOC investigator is unlikely to look beyond the information 
provided by an employer if it appears to provide a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the disputed employment action. The 
incentives, in fact, cut against searching review. This is due in part 
to a proliferation of charges filed with the agency and the failure of 
agency resources to keep pace with demand. . . . Moreover, 
pressure to reduce the EEOC's infamous case backlog remains 
keen, with the agency proudly announcing recently that reforms in 
charge handling procedures slashed the inventory of pending cases 
in half.91  
Therefore, even though the EEOC may be an alternative, the agency has a 
history of problems in terms of its effectiveness. For that reason, it makes sense to 
preserve the courts as the primary source for individuals filing complaints in 
regard to discrimination claims.  
Because Dukes has made it more difficult to address what is known as 
second-generation discrimination, the next section provides a novel approach:  
“fraud-on-the-employment market,” analogous to the “fraud-on-the-market” 
concept used to certify classes in securities cases. 
This would be a court-created concept to be brought to employment law 
from securities law. The fraud-on-the-market concept allows plaintiffs to prove 
that the harm they suffered in the trading of securities existed in the environment 
they were operating in, but does not require them to prove how they were 
specifically harmed. That rule moves the focus on the harm done from the micro 
level—how each individual was treated, to the macro level—the environment to 
which all individuals were subjected. 
III. A “FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET” APPROACH TO CLASS CERTIFICATION 
A.  Unresolved Issues Regarding Class Certification 
                                                          
89 See id. at 177-178 (citations omitted). 
90 Id. (citations omitted). 
91 Bisom-Rapp, supra note 57, at 36-37. 
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As discussed, the key question is how to treat aggregate proof when it is 
used to establish commonality.92 Aggregate proof is evidence that ties the 
“members of the proposed class as a cohesive unit—as the victims of the same 
wrong under governing law, rather than a series of individualized wrongs ill-
suited for class treatment.”93 As discussed, this was the problem the Dukes 
majority had with the class certification—determining whether all members of the 
proposed class suffered from a common wrong.  
The courts find themselves in the position of having to respond to 
continuously changing societal conditions, such as evolving social norms and 
emerging scientific research, or just changed circumstances in society generally. 
In some ways, Dukes illustrates some of these changes in society because today 
the largest employers employ thousands of people.94 The Court in Dukes was 
concerned about the large number of potential claims, which created the concern 
that each one of those plaintiffs might not have been a victim of the same wrong. 
95  
Given that now many very large employers exist, underlying legal 
principles must be revisited. Courts also need to recognize that a larger proportion 
of women today are employed in areas other than the “traditional female jobs” as 
compared with the past.96 This is particularly important given that discrimination 
can easily occur in jobs in which the employee’s gender is contrary to traditional 
sex-roles.97 Research indicates that women are consistently underrated when 
doing what is considered to be men’s work.98 Further, only 14.6% of executive 
                                                          
92 For a complete discussion of aggregate proof, see Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in 
the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 116 (2009). 
93 Id. at 101-02. 
94 Alexander E.M. Hess, The 10 Largest Employers in America, USA TODAY (Aug. 22, 2013, 7:48 
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/08/22/ten-largest-
employers/2680249/ (“Each of America's 10 largest employers has a workforce of more than 
300,000 people.”). 
95 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 (2011) (“Here respondents wish to 
sue about literally millions of employment decisions at once.”). 
96 See More Women Taking on Traditional Male Jobs, MSN TODAY (July 4, 2012), 
http://video.today.msnbc.msn.com/today/48070192#48070192; see also Robert Longley, Many 
U.S. Jobs Have Become Less Male-Dominated, ABOUT.COM (Apr. 2005), 
http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/censusandstatistics/a/menwomenjobs.htm. 
97 See Madeline E. Heilman & Alice H. Eagly, Gender Stereotypes are Alive, Well, and Busy 
Producing Workplace Discrimination. 1 INDUS. & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 393, 394-95 
(2008).  
98 See Madeline E. Heilman et al., Penalties for Success: Reactions to Women Who Succeed at 
Male Gender-Typed Tasks, 89 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 416 (2004); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The 
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW?: THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN (M.I.T. PRESS, 1998). 




officer positions in Fortune 500 companies are held by women, and this 
percentage has failed to increase in recent years.99 Therefore, courts need to 
consider not only the existence of more large companies, but also the greater 
incidence of women facing discrimination in male sex-typed jobs. The application 
of the legal doctrine needs to be reframed to take into account both of these social 
changes. 
In Dukes, the plaintiffs claimed that Wal-Mart’s policy at the national level 
created the basis for the same wrong because it functioned as a “conduit”100 or 
“nexus”101 for discrimination by delegating pay and promotion decisions to its 
local managers on “excessively subjective” terms.102 Even though the district 
court and the appellate court agreed with that claim, the Supreme Court reversed. 
The Court indicated that they believed there was a fundamental problem with 
making Wal-Mart’s policy at the national level a conduit for local management 
decisions.103 Specifically, even though the national policy of subjective decision-
making could have been responsible for the fact that some local managers 
discriminated on the basis of gender, the Court did not agree that the national 
policy necessarily meant that all managers discriminated based on gender.104 For 
the Dukes’ majority, it simply made no sense that a national policy statement 
would automatically mean that every manager, at every level would follow it:  
To be sure, we have recognized that, “in appropriate cases,” giving 
discretion to lower-level supervisors can be the basis of Title VII 
liability under a disparate-impact theory—since “an employer's 
undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking [can have] 
precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible 
intentional discrimination.” But the recognition that this type of 
Title VII claim “can” exist does not lead to the conclusion that 
every employee in a company using a system of discretion has 
such a claim in common.105 
                                                          
99 Statistical Overview of Women in the Workplace, CATALYST, INC. (Mar. 3, 2014), 
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/statistical-overview-women-workplace.  
100 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 145, 152 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 509 F.3d 
1168 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d en banc, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
101 Id. at 150. 
102 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 613 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 
2541 (2011). 
103 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554-55 (2011). 
104 Id. at 2554. 
105 Id. 
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Simply put, the Supreme Court did not think that there was a common 
question of fact to satisfy the requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).106 The Court reasoned 
that even though Wal-Mart’s policy of allowing local discretion may have 
allowed some managers to discriminate on the basis of gender, in many instances, 
the reason for promotion and pay decisions may not have been gender-based. 
Therefore, the Court decided that there was no common wrong.107 
B. Fraud-On-The-Market Doctrine 
The crucial question in class certification is commonality: whether the 
members of the proposed class are the victims of the same wrong and therefore, 
amenable to unitary adjudication. Given the Court’s rejection of aggregate proof 
in Dukes, an analogous argument from securities fraud cases can be used to frame 
a discussion of commonality in employment discrimination cases. The 
relationship between class certification in securities fraud cases and those in 
discrimination cases was pointed out by Richard A. Nagareda, who noted that 
“the identification of the common wrong in both securities fraud class actions and 
pattern-or-practice employment discrimination class actions turns upon the 
triggering of a doctrine—respectively, fraud-on-the-market and an inference of 
discriminatory intent—that then situates class members as the victims of the same 
wrong.”108 This is not a novel observation, but one that was also made by Justice 
Scalia in Dukes: 
Perhaps the most common example of considering a merits 
question at the Rule 23 stage arises in class-action suits for 
securities fraud. Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirement that “questions of law 
or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members” would often be an insuperable 
barrier to class certification, since each of the individual investors 
would have to prove reliance on the alleged misrepresentation. But 
the problem dissipates if the plaintiffs can establish the 
applicability of the so-called “fraud on the market” presumption, 
which says that all traders who purchase stock in an efficient 
market are presumed to have relied on the accuracy of a company's 
public statements.109 
                                                          
106 Id. at 2556-57. 
107 Id. at 2557. 
108 Nagareda, supra note 92, at 117-118. 
109 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 n.6. 




In Dukes, the “insuperable barrier to class certification” was the attempt to 
show that each female was specifically discriminated against due to the company 
policy of allowing local managers discretion. The problem in Dukes would 
dissipate if the plaintiffs could show a “fraud in employment” presumption.   
In securities fraud cases, a plaintiff must show she relied on a misstatement 
of fact by the defendant.110 In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court had to 
decide whether to accept a presumption of relying on the integrity of the 
marketplace.111 In Basic, the officers and directors of Basic, Inc. had not been 
forthcoming about merger negotiations, and some investors traded on Basic 
shares of stock without full information.112 For two years prior to a merger with 
Combustion Engineering, Inc., Basic made three public statements denying any 
merger talks were taking place or that they knew of any corporate developments 
that would account for the heavy trading in their stock.113 Several shareholders 
sold their shares prior to the announcement of the merger.114 These shareholders 
subsequently filed a class action suit against Basic and its directors, claiming a 
violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Act and of Rule 
10b-5 due to the misleading public statements.115  
The district court assumed a presumption of reliance by the investor class 
upon Basic’s public statements and concluded that the lack of disclosure of the 
merger talks had an effect on the market.116 That effect-on-the-market was the 
basis for the common questions of fact or law and predominated over particular 
                                                          
110 To avoid the costs that would occur with individual cases: 
 
[C]lass action plaintiffs began advocating a form of reliance defined by reliance 
on the integrity of the market price, rather than actual reliance on a misstatement 
or omission. This theory became known as fraud on the market, and it applies . . 
. because “most publicly available information is reflected in market price, an 
investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be 
presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.” 
 
Andrew M. Erdlen, Timing is Everything: Markets, Loss, and Proof of Causation in Fraud on the 
Market Actions, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 877, 894 (2011) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224, 247 (1988)).  
111 Basic, 485 U.S. at 226 (“We must also determine whether a person who traded a corporation’s 
shares on a securities exchange after the issuance of a materially misleading statement by the 
corporation may invoke a rebuttable presumption that, in trading, he relied on the integrity of the 
price set by the market.”). 
112 Id. at 227-30.  
113 Id. at 227. 
114 Id. at 228. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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questions pertaining to specifically why individual plaintiffs sold their shares.117 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the class action, but remanded on other grounds.118 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the circuit courts as 
to whether preliminary merger discussions were material and whether the lower 
courts applied the presumption of reliance properly instead of “requiring each 
class member to show direct reliance on Basic’s statements.”119 The Court 
affirmed, stating: 
Presumptions typically serve to assist courts in managing 
circumstances in which direct proof, for one reason or another, is 
rendered difficult. The courts below accepted a presumption, 
created by the fraud-on-the-market theory and subject to rebuttal 
by petitioners, that persons who had traded Basic shares had done 
so in reliance on the integrity of the price set by the market, but 
because of petitioners’ material misrepresentations that price had 
been fraudulently depressed. Requiring a plaintiff to show a 
speculative state of facts, i.e., how he would have acted if omitted 
material information had been disclosed, or if the 
misrepresentation had not been made, would place an 
unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule 10b-5 
plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market.120 
The presumption of reliance that the Court upheld is now known as fraud-
on-the-market (FOTM). Logically, in a modern and transparent securities market, 
the available public information determines the price of stock and that 
information determines the market price regardless of whether an individual 
purchaser or seller actually relies on the information.121 Therefore, proof of actual 
reliance is not needed.  
The FOTM presumption makes sense from a factual point of view because 
the price of stock is determined by publicly available information. It also makes 
sense from a procedural point of view; to require proof of individualized reliance 
by each member of the class would have, in all likelihood, prevented those injured 
from proceeding with a class action suit because the individual issues would have 
overwhelmed the common issue. In effect, without this presumption the persons 
injured would have to show the impossible—that each one relied on the lack of 
                                                          
117 Levinson v. Basic, Inc., No. C79-1220, 1984 WL 1152, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 1984), rev’d, 
786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1984), vacated, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
118 Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 1984), vacated, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
119 Basic, 485 U.S. at 230. 
120 Id. at 245 (citations omitted). 
121 See id. at 241-42.  




the possible merger information. Essentially, the Court believed that such a 
presumption, besides providing judicial economy, was a fairness and public 
policy issue.122 FOTM moves the wrong from the micro level of each individual 
investor having to prove that she was harmed by the lack of information, to the 
macro level, where the wrong is the environment that allows trading to occur 
without reflecting all of the facts. Therefore, the assessment of whether the wrong 
occurred is removed from the micro to the macro level—the trading environment.  
 The “individual issues overwhelming the common issue” was the central 
problem in Dukes because the Court thought it would be too hard to prove why 
each individual pay or promotion decision was made by the various local 
managers.123 This is similar to the buying or selling of stock in Basic because 
each buyer or seller may have had a different reason for engaging in the stock 
transaction.  In response, the Court stated that though there may have been a 
variety of reasons for the stock transactions, the publicly available information 
still set the market price.124 Had the merger negotiation been public, the price for 
the shares of stock would have been different, arguably.  The fact that the price 
did not reflect that information was the common injury to all who traded in the 
stock regardless of any other reasons for the transaction.125 
A similar argument can be made for “fraud-on-the-employment market” 
(FOEM). If at the time the plaintiffs took their positions with Wal-Mart, the 
discretionary power of the local managers to make promotion and pay decisions 
with no defined criteria was not disclosed, then regardless of why the supervisors 
made the employment decisions for each employee, the common injury would be 
that at the time they agreed to take the position with Wal-Mart, they did not have 
all the relevant information about employment with Wal-Mart.  
In Basic, the relevant information needed to be disclosed prior to the 
investors trading in those shares of stock. Learning about the information after 
they traded was considered to be too late, since the trading decision had already 
been made. However, the Court in Basic allowed a rebuttable presumption in 
regards to those who may have not only relied on the market price but also knew 
about the possible merger.126 If an employer fully disclosed the promotion, pay 
increase, and other employment-related procedures to some of the potential 
employees prior to them taking the job, but not to all, then that disclosure would 
trigger the rebuttable presumption in regard to those employees.  
                                                          
122 Id. at 245.  
123 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555 (2011). 
124 Basic, 485 U.S. at 242.  
125 Id. 
126 See id. at 245 (discussing “fraud-on-the-market theory and subject to rebuttal”).  
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However, that would not affect the certification of the class because 
employees only need to prove that the company not have a standard procedure of 
full disclosure of relevant information about promotions, pay increases, and other 
important employment information before offering the position. As the Court later 
stated in Basic: 
“Reliance,” we have explained, “is an essential element of the § 
10(b) private cause of action” because “proof of reliance ensures 
that there is a proper connection between a defendant's 
misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury.” “The traditional (and 
most direct) way” for a plaintiff to demonstrate reliance “is by 
showing that he was aware of a company's statement and engaged 
in a relevant transaction . . . based on that specific 
misrepresentation.” We have recognized, however, that requiring 
proof of direct reliance “would place an unnecessarily unrealistic 
evidentiary burden on [a] plaintiff who has traded on an 
impersonal market.” Accordingly, in Basic the Court endorsed the 
“fraud-on-the-market” theory, which permits certain Rule 10b-5 
plaintiffs to invoke a rebuttable presumption of reliance on 
material misrepresentations aired to the general public.127  
Lack of important information distorts the employment market.  As in 
Basic, the lack of information distorts the securities market in which one is 
trading. Providing that information in an employee handbook or employee 
orientation after taking the job would not be sufficient because the person already 
changed her position, by taking the job, without full disclosure of all the relevant 
information. In order to certify the class, as in Basic, the plaintiff could be 
required to proof that material information was not publicly available, and that 
lack of information injured those who traded in that security. At trial, the 
defendant could then try to prove that some of those who traded actually did have 
knowledge of the information. Moving the common harm up to the macro level in 
order to certify the class removes the focus on the micro level, in regard to those 
who might not have been injured by the lack of information, but allows the 
defendant to rebut the presumption when possible.  
In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, the Court 
reaffirmed its decision in Basic with regard to fraud-on-the-market, including the 
issue of materiality of the missing information.128 Connecticut Retirement Plans 
                                                          
127 Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013) (citations 
omitted).  
128 Id. at 1203-04. 




and Trust Funds filed a securities-fraud complaint against a biotechnology 
company, Amgen, Inc.; Connecticut sought class-action certification under Rule 
23 and invoked the FOTM presumption for certification. In the case: 
Amgen contend[ed] that to meet the predominance requirement, 
Connecticut Retirement must do more than plausibly plead that 
Amgen's alleged misrepresentations and misleading omissions 
materially affected Amgen's stock price. According to Amgen, 
certification must be denied unless Connecticut Retirement proves 
materiality, for immaterial misrepresentations or omissions, by 
definition, would have no impact on Amgen's stock price in an 
efficient market.129  
The Court stated: 
While Connecticut Retirement certainly must prove materiality to 
prevail on the merits, we hold that such proof is not a prerequisite 
to class certification. Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that 
questions common to the class predominate, not that those 
questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class. 
Because materiality is judged according to an objective standard, 
the materiality of Amgen's alleged misrepresentations and 
omissions is a question common to all members of the class 
Connecticut Retirement would represent.130  
The Court went on: 
Contrary to Amgen's argument, the key question in this case is not 
whether materiality is an essential predicate of the fraud-on-the-
market theory; indisputably it is. Instead, the pivotal inquiry is 
whether proof of materiality is needed to ensure that the questions 
of law or fact common to the class will “predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members” as the litigation 
progresses. For two reasons, the answer to this question is clearly 
“no”. . . . Therefore, under the plain language of Rule 23(b)(3), 
plaintiffs are not required to prove materiality at the class-
certification stage. In other words, they need not, at that threshold, 
                                                          
129 Id. at 1191 (emphases in original). 
130 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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prove that the predominating question will be answered in their 
favor.131 
The FOTM presumption eliminates the requirement to look at each 
individual manager’s pay or promotion decisions, much like Basic eliminated the 
requirement to look at each investment decision. As a consequence, the common 
question of fact is moved up to a different decision-making level and is shifted to 
the “buyer” of the job—it is at the point when the employee makes the decision to 
take a job without full knowledge about pay and promotion policies, and not at 
the point when the local managers are making their promotion or pay decisions. 
That would mean that in a case such as Dukes, the decision to take the job without 
all the relevant information is the question of fact common to all the employees. 
At that point, if there was not full disclosure of the employer’s policies, then the 
potential employee could not make an informed decision of whether to take the 
job. Therefore, an employer must make sure important information about a job, 
including the policies for promotion and pay increases, is fully disclosed prior to 
offering that position to the person. Without that information, it would be the 
same reasoning as in Basic.  
The Basic Court correctly stated that the presumption of reliance is a 
rebuttable presumption in regard to those investors who actually knew of the 
merger talks. Therefore, if the plaintiff actually knew of Wal-Mart’s pay and 
promotion policy and still took the job, she would not have a claim. Similarly, the 
FOTM presumption can be rebutted if the defendant can persuade a court that a 
person did not rely on the market to purchase or sell because she had accurate 
information from another source.132  
The Supreme Court most recently addressed the FOTM presumption in 
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Company.
133 In Halliburton, the Fifth 
Circuit upheld the trial court’s decision to deny class certification under Rule 
23(b)(3).134 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court overruled the Fifth 
Circuit. The Supreme Court held that Basic properly dictated the outcome of the 
case because it “permit[ed] plaintiffs to invoke a rebuttable presumption of 
reliance based on . . .‘fraud-on-the-market’ theory.”135 Basic also made clear that 
an omission may create FOTM, stating “[a]s we clarify today, materiality depends 
                                                          
131 Id. at 1195-96 (emphasis in original). 
132 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249 (1988). 
133 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).  
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on the significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or 
misrepresented information.”136  
Reliance provides the requisite causal connection between a defendant's 
misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury, because requiring specific evidence 
“would place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the. . . 
plaintiff[.]”137 As we saw in Dukes, that “unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary 
burden” proved fatal to the plaintiffs’ case.  
The FOEM approach would allow plaintiffs to establish a class without a 
discussion of the possible merits of each individual claimant, compared to Dukes, 
where class certification posed a problem. Under a FOEM approach, the courts 
would assess the characteristics of the employment market to determine whether 
the proposed employee class is relevantly common as to warrant class 
certification.138 
C.  Framing Discrimination Cases Using a Fraud on the Employment Market 
Doctrine 
In the future, when faced with cases like Dukes in which millions of 
individuals seek certification as a class, the courts should adopt the FOEM 
framework. This would resolve some of the class certification and structural 
discrimination issues that the court has wrestled with in the past.  
As discussed, the size of the class in Dukes was a problem. The Court 
concluded that it was not possible for all members of the proposed class to have 
been injured by the discretionary powers of the local managers.  
Assuming the same facts present in the Dukes case, in a world dictated by 
the FOEM framework, a potential injury would occur when a female applies for a 
job at an organization in which, prior to offering a job, the organization fails to 
provide full disclosure of the process used for promotions and other employment 
decisions. FOEM would be triggered by this lack of information like FOTM is 
triggered by the lack of information available in the market, such as a false 
statement or omission of a material term by the seller of the security. FOTM does 
not focus on what happens after the misinformation is communicated to the 
unwitting victim, but rather focuses on the sale or purchase of a security. The 
FOTM doctrine assumes that uncorrected fraud is embedded in the market price 
and all who traded during the relevant time period relied on the integrity of the 
market to determine the market price. 
                                                          
136 Basic, 485 U.S. at 240. 
137 Id. at 245 (citation omitted). 
138 For a discussion, see Nagareda supra note 92, at 164-165. 
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FOEM would rely on a similar line of reasoning. In other words, the women 
who are unaware that the company employs practices that increase the likelihood 
of discrimination, such as providing local managers the discretionary power to 
make promotion or pay increase decisions, could be class certified. Employees 
may, like traders, presume integrity in the current market price (in this case, the 
pay being offered for the job)—i.e., that it reflects unbiased job relevant factors 
only—as well as integrity in terms of promotion procedures.  
Simply put, such information, had it been known, would stop a female from 
applying for and then accepting that job being that other jobs in the employment 
market would not have the same potential for gender discrimination.  
In Dukes, Wal-Mart’s corporate policy gave local managers discretion that 
could result in sexist pay and promotion decisions in part because of the lack of 
defined criteria. Because female job applicants were not aware of the extent of the 
managers’ discretion, female applicants’ and employees’ perceptions of the 
employment opportunities available to women at Wal-Mart were unfairly 
distorted. The proposed employee class—females who wanted to be employed at 
Wal-Mart—presumably relied on the fraud when they applied for the job. By 
using the nondisclosure of the subjective decision-making policy as the basis for 
the common question, the aggregate proof problem disappears.  
CONCLUSION 
Some commenters believe that Dukes provides a shield for large companies 
from class action lawsuits that claim discrimination. They argue that there needs 
to be some protection for businesses from easy class certification that could be 
used to “blackmail” companies into a large settlement. Still others argue that carte 
blanche should not be given to potential plaintiffs, the plaintiffs should have the 
ability to bring discrimination lawsuits that directly reflect the type of 
discriminatory practices that are occurring in today’s society. Dukes demonstrates 
a lack of understanding by the Court regarding the now-subtler acts of 
discrimination. The type of discrimination that remains and predominates today is 
more structural in nature: second-generation discrimination. 
 The holding in Dukes should be reexamined in light of second-generation 
discrimination.  The general, holistic evidence provided by the plaintiffs in Dukes 
should be more seriously considered as a reason for certifying the class because 
second-generation discrimination resulting from a single identifiable practice is 
unlikely. Effectively addressing this type of discrimination requires a different 
approach as compared to the discrete-events-approach the courts found useful for 
addressing first-generation discrimination.  
However, given the direction of the Court with regard to this type of 
evidence, courts, when determining class certification of some types of 




discrimination cases, could establish a doctrine similar to the fraud-on-the-market 
doctrine found in securities fraud cases. This approach would move proof of the 
harm to the macro level, instead of the micro level, and would ultimately require 
organizations not only to have nondiscrimination policies in place, but also to 
effectively implement them. 
